WEHRFRITZ: Some members of the aid community have come to believe that food aid is enabling Kim Jong Il’s regime and preventing the kind of change that will ultimately be necessary to fix North Korea. Is that not a valid argument? BERTINI: And therefore all the food aid should be stopped so that, for heaven knows how long, people would starve to death because we don’t like the [North Korean] government? That’s an immoral position.
Is it always the case that where there is famine, the WFP gives aid? We never say “We don’t like the government, so we won’t send food” if that food is the difference between life and death. We send food to southern Sudan, where we have to spend millions of extra dollars dropping it out of airplanes. We send food to Angola. We send food to Afghanistan. We send food everywhere.
You’ve returned from your fourth trip to North Korea. What’s the situation? In 1997 we saw many children in schools who were malnourished, who had orange hair and extended bellies and were skeletal. Our monitors have been going to the schools since [then], and so they’ve seen that the children are far healthier. But we also saw children in pediatric hospitals who were emaciated, malnourished and had diarrhea. The [situation] is stable but precarious.
How confident are you that WFP food aid is getting to the hungry in North Korea? Monitoring is always challenging. We have the largest contingent, 56 international [aid workers], in Pyongyang and five suboffices. We’re fairly confident [that aid is reaching hungry people] for several reasons. One is that most of our aid goes through institutions, like schools, that we can visit. When you go time after time, you not only see how the children progress, but you also see the routine during feeding. Do [recipients] know what to do when food arrives? Is it orderly, or is there a panic? After you’ve been in this business for a while, you can tell a lot from that. Second, we send foods that are self-targeting, which [in North Korea] are primarily wheat and corn. These are not staples in the North Korean diet, so people wouldn’t want to eat them unless they were really hungry. Third, a lot of our food for children is processed in the country. The factories operate all day. We go to them regularly to see how they’re doing.
Do you sense any effort to revive agriculture in North Korea? No. There are small, incremental changes, like an initiative that started a couple of years ago to grow more potatoes. Double-cropping has had some success. When we send in a crop-assessment mission in early October, I’m asking them to look at whether [fertilizer sent from South Korea] was effective. Agricultural experts say that with improved agricultural practices, with more fertilizer, North Korea still will not grow enough to feed itself. It just doesn’t have the right kind of land and climate. Other countries are in the same situation. But many of those countries have the ability to purchase food somewhere else. North Korea doesn’t, or doesn’t choose to do it.
But they can afford to purchase weapons from Russia and limousines for the elite. That must be frustrating. We have to keep our eye always on our purpose, and our purpose is to end hunger. We don’t have the luxury of deciding whether or not we like the government or its priorities. That’s just not an option for us, and I don’t think it’s an option for any human being in this world.
Is it getting harder to find willing donor states? This is our sixth year in North Korea, and each year we’ve been virtually fully funded. This year we’ve requested 810,000 tons [of grain], the largest request we’ve ever made, and so far we have 91 percent of the volume sourced. What next year will be like, I don’t know.
Are you concerned about donor fatigue, and is there an exit strategy from North Korea? There’s not [an exit strategy] right now. If there is a decent harvest this year, we won’t have to ask for as much aid. And if there’s good weather and a good harvest and more fertilizer next year, we’ll still have to ask for more. The country will need food aid over the long term. Really, the major thing that will change it is having an economy that allows for importing food.
title: “Feeding North Korea” ShowToc: true date: “2022-12-13” author: “Juliet Talbert”
NEWSWEEK: Why should the world keep feeding North Korea?
Catherine Bertini: If we don’t send food, children will starve. Period. That’s the argument.
It’s that simple?
Yes.
Some members of the aid community have come to believe that food aid is enabling Kim Jong Il’s regime and preventing the kind of change that will ultimately be necessary to fix North Korea. Isn’t that a valid argument?
And therefore all the food aid should be stopped so that, for heaven knows how long, people would starve to death because we don’t like the government? That’s an immoral position.
Is it always the case that where there is famine the WFP gives aid?
As long as we can have access to distribution and [understand] the management of the process, we send food. We never say: “We don’t like the government so we won’t send food,” if that food is the difference between life and death. We send food to southern Sudan where we have to spend millions of extra dollars dropping it out of airplanes, we send food to Angola, we send food to Afghanistan. We send food everywhere.
You’ve just returned from your fourth trip to North Korea. What’s the situation today?
I was there in ‘97 [at] the depth of the crisis. The difference, in terms of the health of the children especially, is immense. In 1997, we saw many children in schools who were malnourished. Who had orange hair, extended bellies and were skeletal. Our monitors have been going to the schools since [then], and so they’ve seen that the children are far healthier. But we also saw children in pediatric hospitals who were emaciated, malnourished and had diarrhea. The [situation] is stable but precarious.
How confident are you that WFP food aid is getting to the hungry in North Korea?
Monitoring is always challenging. We have the largest contingent-56 international [aid workers] in Pyongyang and five sub-offices. We’re fairly confident for several reasons. One is that most of our aid goes through institutions like schools that we can visit. When you go time after time, you not only see how the children progress, but you also see the routine during feeding. Do [recipients] know what to do when food arrives? Is it orderly or is there a panic? After you’ve been in this business for a while you can tell a lot from that.
Second, we send foods that are self-targeting, which [in North Korea] are primarily wheat and corn. These are not staples in the North Korean diet, so other people wouldn’t want to eat them unless they were really hungry. Third, a lot of our food for children is processed in the country. The factories operate all day. We go to them regularly to see how they’re doing.
Do you or your colleagues sense that any reform effort is afoot to revive agriculture in North Korea?
No. There are small, incremental changes, like an initiative that started a couple of years ago to grow more potatoes. Double cropping has had some success. When we send in a crop assessment mission in early October, I’m asking them to look at whether [fertilizer aid from South Korea] was effective. Agricultural exports say that with improved agricultural practices, with more fertilizer, North Korea still will not grow enough to feed itself. It just doesn’t have the right kind of land and climate. Other countries are in the same situation. But many of those countries have the ability to purchase food somewhere else. North Korea doesn’t, or doesn’t choose to do it.
But they can afford to purchase weapons from Russia and limousines for the elite. That must be frustrating.
We have to keep our eye always on our purpose, and our purpose is to end hunger. We don’t have the luxury of deciding whether or not we like the government or its priorities. That’s just not an option for us, and I don’t think it’s an option for any human being in this world.
Is it getting harder to find willing donor states?
This is our sixth year in North Korea and each year we’ve been virtually fully funded. This year we’ve requested 810,000 tons [of grain], enough to feed one third of the population. It’s the largest request we’ve ever made, and so far we have 91 percent of the volume sourced. What next year will be like, I don’t know.
Seven years into the famine and the WFP made its highest aid request ever for North Korea in 2001. Are you concerned about donor fatigue, and is there an exit strategy?
There’s not right now. If there is a decent harvest this year we won’t have to ask for as much aid. And if there’s good weather and a good harvest and more fertilizer next year, we’ll still have to ask for more. The country will need food aid over the long term. Really, the major thing that will change it is having an economy that allows for importing food.
And the barrier to that is ideological.
There may be many barriers: political, ideological, commercial. Humanitarians can do this lifesaving work that I believe we are doing, but it is left to the political leadership of North Korea and other countries to make the difference over the long term. That relates to peace and stability and growth.
